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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jorge E. Rodriquez appeals from his judgment of conviction for domestic battery with
traumatic injury in the presence of a child. The district court abused its discretion by allowing
Mr. Rodriquez’s mother-in-law to testify, over his hearsay objection, that her daughter told her
that Mr. Rodriquez had hit her. This Court should vacate Mr. Rodriquez’s conviction and
remand this case for a new trial.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Rodriquez with domestic battery with traumatic injury in the
presence of a child after his wife, Autumn Rodriquez,1 reported that he had hit her in the face and
legs while she was nursing their daughter on April 17, 2016, leaving her with a broken nose and
bruises on her legs and face. (R., pp.20–22, 40–42, 46–47; Tr. Vol. I, p.122, L.17–p.123, L.16,
p.125, L.12–p.126, L.7.) Mr. Rodriquez pled not guilty and took the case to trial. 2
By the time the case went to trial, Autumn no longer maintained that Mr. Rodriquez had
hit her as she had originally explained.3 (See generally Tr. Vol. I,4 p.109, L.15–p.148, L.16.)
Instead, Autumn said that she had made up that story because she was mad at Mr. Rodriquez,
who she believed was having an affair. (Tr. Vol. I, p.114, Ls.20–23, p.119, Ls.1–12, p.120,

1

For clarity’s sake, this brief will refer to Autumn by her first name.
The first trial in this cases ended in a hung jury. (R., p.104.)
3
Autumn testified consistently with her original story at the preliminary hearing in this case,
though she testified at trial that she did so only because of threats made by the prosecutor. (See
Tr. Vol. I, p.126, L.16–p.128, L.7, p.136, L.11–p.137, L.25.)
4
Citations to “Tr. Vol. I.” refer to the transcript of the first day of trial, held on July 27, 2018,
and use the page number of the electronic document (which correspond to the page numbers that
are printed on the upper right-hand corner of each page, not the page numbers printed on the
bottom middle of each page). Citations to “Tr. Vol. II” refer to the second day of trial, held on
July 28, 2017.
2

1

Ls.5–21, p.121, Ls.17–22, p.124, L.25–p.125, L.11; Def. Ex. A (copies of messages between
Mr. Rodriquez’s sister and his ex-girlfriend, which Mr. Rodriquez’s sister forwarded to
Autumn).)

What really happened is Autumn wanted to see text messages between

Mr. Rodriquez and his ex-girlfriend, the two struggled over the phone, and the phone
accidentally hit her in the face. (Tr. Vol. I, p.111, L.6–p.112, L.1, p.114, L.18–p.115, L.3, p.134,
Ls.5–13, p.138, L.12–p.140, L.25.) The bruises on her legs were from her job as a cashier at
Costco in Boise. (Tr. Vol. I, p.135, Ls.6–p24.) Thus, the question for the jury to decide was
essentially which version of Autumn’s story was true.
After Autumn testified that she had lied about Mr. Rodriquez hitting her, the State called
Officer Cameron, a domestic violence officer for the Boise Police Department. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.149, L.5–p.150, L.9.) Officer Cameron had no knowledge about the facts of this case, but
testified as an expert regarding domestic violence, including why a domestic violence victim
might not report a crime, might recant, or might minimize the abuser’s conduct. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.158, L.10–p.168, L.19.)
The State also relied heavily on the testimony of witnesses who interacted with Autumn
after the alleged altercation. Two of Autumn’s coworkers at Costco testified that they noticed
Autumn had makeup covering bruising on her face when she came into work on April 20, and
one said that she was “solemn” and “quiet.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.181, L.1–p.184, L.9, p.188, L.8–p.191,
L.17.) So they brought Autumn into the store manager’s office where she cried, called the care
line available to employees, and then left work early. (Tr. Vol. I, p.182, L.9–p.183, L.22, p.191,
L.18–p.194, L.7.) One of the coworkers then followed Autumn to pick up her daughter at
daycare. (Tr. Vol. I, p.194, L.14–195, L.9.)

2

After picking up her daughter, Autumn drove to her parent’s house in Burley. (Tr. Vol. I,
p.117, L.23–p.118, L.7, p.120, Ls.4–6.) Autumn tried calling her parents to let them know she
was coming, and only was able to reach her father. (Tr. Vol. I, p.216, Ls.2–15, p.227, Ls.17–21.)
He described her as “very frightened” on the phone. (Tr. Vol. I, p.216, Ls.2–15.) Autumn’s
parents testified that, when Autumn got there, she was shaking, upset, fearful, and had been
crying. (Tr. Vol. I, p.219, Ls.10–19, p.228, Ls.19–22.) Autumn’s mother, who happens to be a
registered nurse, looked Autumn over and noticed a handful of injuries. (Tr. Vol. I, p.229, Ls.5–
21.) She then testified, over defense counsel’s objection, that Autumn told her that her husband
had caused the injuries. (Tr. Vol. I, p.230, Ls.9–21.) Officer Barnes responded to the home that
night, spoke to Autumn, took photos, and referred the case to the Boise County Sheriff’s
Department. (Tr. Vol. I, p.199, L.17–p.206, L.14; State’s Exs. 7–9.)
The next day, Autumn went to Dr. Petersen’s office where her aunt worked as the
doctor’s assistant. (Tr. Vol. II, p.12, L.20–p.13, L.2.) Autumn wrote “My spouse hit me at
home,” on the intake form, told her aunt that Mr. Rodriquez had hit her while she was nursing
their daughter, and told Dr. Petersen that her husband had hit her. (Tr. Vol. II, p.13, L.19–p.14,
L.6, p.24, L.25–p.25, L.22; State’s Ex. 10.) According to Dr. Petersen, Autumn had a broken
nose. (Tr. Vol. II, p.25, L.23–p.28, L.3; see also State’s Ex. 11 (x-rays).)
The jury found Mr. Rodriquez guilty (R., p.408), and the court sentenced him to a total of
eighteen years, with eight years fixed (R., pp.448–51).
(R., pp.457–63.)

3

Mr. Rodriquez timely appealed.

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing Autumn’s mother to offer hearsay
testimony that Autumn told her that Mr. Rodriquez hit her?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing Autumn’s Mother To Offer Hearsay
Testimony That Autumn Told Her That Mr. Rodriquez Hit Her
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” I.R.E. 801(c).
Hearsay is generally inadmissible, unless an exception applies. I.R.E. 802. One such exception
is a statement that “(A) is made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—medical diagnosis or
treatment; and (B) describes medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; or their
source.” I.R.E. 803(4). That exception “is premised on the assumption that such statements are
generally trustworthy because the declarant is motivated by a desire to receive proper medical
treatment and will therefore be truthful in giving pertinent information to the physician.” State v.
Nelson, 131 Idaho 210, 216 (Ct. App. 1998). When determining whether the exception applies,
the court should “consider any factors which bear upon the likelihood that the [declarant] made
the statement for this purpose, including evidence indicating whether the [declarant] understood
the need to speak truthfully to the physician and factors that otherwise indicate the reliability of
the statements.” State v. Kay, 129 Idaho 507, 518 (Ct. App. 1996) (discussing the requisite
analysis regarding a statement made by a young child).
This Court reviews the district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 6 (2013). A district court acts within its discretion if it
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to
it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id.
Autumn’s mother, Katheryn Hines, testified about what happened when Autumn got to
her parent’s home on April 20.

5

Q. What did she physically look like? Take your time.
A. I know I’m a nurse, but it’s real different when it’s your own. She had
two black eyes. I immediately put my hands up to her head. She had lumps on
her head. She had—
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. May we approach?
THE COURT: Um-hmm.
(Sidebar.)
BY [THE PROSECUTOR]:
Q. Continue on with your examination of your daughter.
A. She had lumps on her head. She had hair that had been pulled out on
top of her head. She had bruises on her wrists. She had a shoe-print bruise on the
inside of one of her legs. She had multiple bruises on another leg.
And she said, “I think my nose”—
Q. At this point, we’re just going to—
A. Okay.
Q. You’re an RN; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. At this point—I know it’s your own daughter—did you feel that you
were acting as a RN or her mother.
A. Both. It’s my obligation, as a registered nurse, to report anything that I
think is a danger to another person. I would lose my license if I didn’t.
Q. How did she say she obtained these injuries?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I’ll allow it, without hearsay.
[THE PROSECUTOR]:
Q. How did she say she obtained these injuries?
A. She said that her husband had done it.
Q. Would you say again that a little clearer. I’m sorry.
A. She said her husband Jorge had done it.
Q. Had done one of these injuries? Or . . .
A. No, everything.
(Tr. Vol I, p.229, L.5–p.230, L.21.)
The district court abused its discretion by allowing Ms. Hines to testify that Autumn had
told her that Mr. Rodriquez hit her because it did not act consistently with Idaho Rules of
Evidence 801, 802, and 803. Ms. Hines’ testimony was hearsay because it introduced Autumn’s
out-of-court statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted, namely that Mr. Rodriquez had
hit Autumn. See I.R.E. 801(c). Although the court admitted the statement under the exception
for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, that exception does not

6

apply here. See I.R.E. 803(4). In particular, the State did not show that Autumn made the
statement for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, but instead mistakenly focused on the
intent of Autumn’s mother to try to establish that she was in essence conducting a medical
examination when Autumn made the statement.

Because Ms. Hines’ subjective intent is

irrelevant, and the totality of the circumstances indicates that Autumn made that statement
because she was upset and not so that her mother could diagnose or treat her, the exception does
not apply. The court should have excluded that testimony. See I.R.E. 802.
The hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment does not
apply to Ms. Hines’ testimony because Autumn’s statement was not “made for” medical
diagnosis or treatment. See I.R.E. 803(4)(A). Autumn testified that she went to her parents’
house in Burley four days after the alleged incident “Because I was upset with my husband
because we had been fighting, and I thought for sure he was cheating on me. I just wanted to get
away from him.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.118, Ls.3–5; see also Tr. Vol. I, p.217, Ls.7–19 (Autumn’s father
testifying that Autumn asked to stay with her parents).) Further, Autumn testified that she told
her mother that Mr. Rodriquez had hit her “because I was upset,” that she was upset because she
thought Mr. Rodriquez was cheating on her, and that she lied to her mother when she said
Mr. Rodriquez hit her. (Tr. Vol. I, p.111, L.6–p.115, L.13, p.117, L.23–p.118, L.7, p.120, L.4–
p.121, L.25, p.129, L.23–p.130, L.1.) There is simply no evidence that Autumn was “motivated
by a desire to receive proper medical treatment” when she told her mother that Mr. Rodriquez hit
her, and thus we cannot assume that Autumn’s statement was trustworthy. Nelson, 131 Idaho at
216. Thus, the hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment does
not apply here.
The State’s post-hoc attempt to shoehorn what was clearly a statement made by a

7

distraught daughter to her mother into the hearsay exception for statements made for medical
diagnosis or treatment missed the mark. (See Tr. Vol. I, p.221, L.18, p.229, L.15, p.235, L.1,
p.237, L.7, p.242, L.5) (the prosecutor repeatedly using the term “exam” and examination” to
describe the way that Ms. Hines reacted when seeing her daughter’s injuries).) The relevant
inquiry is not Ms. Hines’ intent when hearing the statement, but rather Autumn’s purpose when
making it. See I.R.E 803(4); Nelson, 131 Idaho at 216. Therefore, it is irrelevant that Ms. Hines
happened to be a registered nurse, and that she felt like she was acting both as a nurse and a
mother at the time because she is a mandatory reporter. (Tr. Vol. I, p.229, L.25–p.230, L.8.) It
is equally irrelevant that Autumn’s father testified that his wife “checked Autumn over,” and
answered affirmatively when asked whether that was “akin to a medical examination.” (Tr. Vol.
I, p.221, Ls.15–19.) To be sure, Ms. Hines acted as any mother—nurse or not—would have
under the circumstances, neither of Autumn’s parents testified that Ms. Hines actually diagnosed
or treated Autumn (see generally Tr. Vol. I, p.213, L.1–p.242, L.17; see Tr. Vol. I, p.239, Ls.2324) (Ms. Hines responding to defense counsel’s question about Autumn’s injuries to her nose
being very apparent by saying, “Because I’m not an orthopedist, I can’t say without x-rays.”)),
and Autumn went to Dr. Petersen’s office the next day, where he diagnosed her with a broken
nose (Tr. Vol. II, p.25, L.5–p.28, L.25).
Because Autumn did not tell her mother that Mr. Rodriquez had hit her so that her mother
could diagnose or treat her, no exception to the hearsay rule applies and the court abused its
discretion by admitting Ms. Hines’ testimony.

8

CONCLUSION
Mr. Rodriquez respectfully asks that this Court vacate his conviction and remand this
case to the district court for a new trial.
DATED this 13th day of November, 2018.

/s/ Maya P. Waldron
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of November, 2018, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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